Beyond the GHS 73 Billion Headline: An Engineering Audit of the Fourth Estate’s Procurement Claims

By Engr. Hasford Judge Quartey

The recent report by The Fourth Estate alleging that the Ministry of Roads and Highways awarded 81 sole-sourced contracts worth over GHS 73 billion within seven months has stirred significant public concern. While the data reflects raw figures obtained via Right to Information (RTI) requests, the issue is not the data itself, but the interpretation of that data, which overlooks the technical, legal, and engineering architecture of Ghanaian procurement.

RTI disclosures provide access to records, not conclusions. The responsibility of accurate classification and contextual interpretation remains analytical, not administrative.

When examined through a professional lens, the narrative reveals critical gaps in classification, context, and financial reality.

1. The Classification Problem: Not All Non-Open Procurement Is Sole-Sourcing

At the heart of the claim lies a fundamental misclassification. Ghana’s procurement framework, under the Public Procurement Act, allows for multiple methods beyond open tendering, such as Restricted Tendering and Framework Agreements.

Aggregating all non-open methods under the singular label of “sole sourcing” is a technical overreach. Without contract-by-contract validation using specific Public Procurement Authority (PPA) approval codes, the widely cited “76% sole-sourcing” figure remains a procedural assumption rather than a verified fact.

2. Project Continuity: Legacy Contracts, Novation, and the Risk of Financial Exposure

The report fails to distinguish between newly initiated contracts and ongoing state obligations. Infrastructure delivery operates on the principle of continuity. Several major projects, including the Suame Interchange, Ofankor–Nsawam Road, and Adenta–Dodowa Road, were not conceived within this seven-month window; they are legacy projects restructured under new financing arrangements.

This process, known as novation, ensures efficiency and protects prior public investment. Halting these projects for re-tendering would not only waste resources already committed but also expose the state to significant judgment debts and contractual liabilities that could far exceed any perceived savings. Categorizing these legally necessitated transitions as “newly sole-sourced” disregards both operational and legal realities.

3. Misleading Financial Framing: Commitment vs. Cash Flow

The headline figure of GHS 73 billion is presented in a way that suggests immediate expenditure, which is fundamentally misleading. Infrastructure contracts are multi-year commitments involving phased disbursements tied to project milestones.

Total contract values include contingencies and long-term obligations, not immediate fiscal outflows. Without aligning this figure to actual budget releases or cash flow schedules, the claim risks overstating immediate fiscal exposure and distorting public perception of the national treasury.

4. The Missing Technical Core: Where Is the Engineering Audit?

A large number does not automatically imply inefficiency. The real test of “value for money” lies in technical validation, not numerical summation. Procurement method alone does not determine value for money, cost efficiency is established through engineering and financial validation.

Professional accountability must ask:

Are unit rates per kilometer consistent with current market benchmarks?

Do Bills of Quantities (BoQs) reflect realistic project scope and geotechnical constraints?

Are cost structures aligned with engineering standards?

Without such analysis, it is impossible to conclude whether GHS 73 billion represents waste or strategic investment. Accountability must be grounded in engineering evidence, not numerical aggregation.

5. The Alleged Policy Contradiction: A Misreading of Intent

The claim that current practices contradict the President’s policy commitments to curb sole sourcing is based on a flawed interpretation. The objective of such reforms is to eliminate “excessive and unjustified” sole sourcing, not to abolish lawful procurement methods required for complex infrastructure delivery.

Sole sourcing is explicitly permitted under the Public Procurement Act. The policy objective targets misuse, not the lawful application of procurement provisions where urgency, continuity, or specialized expertise is required.

Furthermore, policy reform does not invalidate inherited obligations. Governments must balance reform commitments with the practical necessity of completing ongoing projects to avoid stalled infrastructure and escalating costs.

Presenting legally justified procurement decisions as a contradiction of policy is therefore a misreading of both intent and implementation reality.

6. The Burden of Proof Still Applies

In both law and engineering, the principle remains clear: he who alleges must prove. While investigative journalism plays a vital watchdog role, it must adhere to the same standards of rigor it demands of public institutions.

Aggregated figures, absent methodological transparency, procurement classification clarity, and unit-rate validation, do not meet the threshold of a forensic audit.

Conclusion: From Headlines to Hard Evidence

Public accountability must be driven by precision, not projection. Until the current claims are supported by:

verified procurement classifications,p

a clear separation of legacy and new contracts, and

rigorous engineering cost analysis,

the “GHS 73 billion sole-sourcing” narrative remains an assertion requiring further substantiation rather than a definitive conclusion.

Ghana’s infrastructure debate must evolve beyond headline figures toward institutional solutions. Establishing independent engineering and financial audit systems for major public projects would not only strengthen accountability but also eliminate the ambiguity that allows assumptions to be presented as facts.

Ghana does not need louder procurement debates, it needs better measurement systems.