The Bank of Ghana – 2025 Losses: The Accountability Test – Abena Osei-Asare writes

1. The 2025 financial statements show a material worsening of the Bank of Ghana’s financial position. The Bank recorded a loss of GH¢15.63 billion in 2025, against GH¢9.49 billion in 2024. Negative equity for the Bank of Ghana Group deteriorated from GH¢58.62 billion in 2024 to GH¢93.82 billion in 2025.
2. The headline loss of GH¢15.63 billion in 2025 is not the full story. The reported loss is not a reflection of underlying stability. It is a managed outcome supported by asset liquidation. The Bank is increasingly relying on gold sales to contain financial deterioration.

Without sales of gold purchased between 2023 and 2024, the Bank could have recorded significantly higher losses, placing it in a far deeper financial hole. The Bank of Ghana’s financial position would have been substantially worse without those gold disposals.

The conclusion is now clear. The gold accumulated in 2023 and 2024 was not sold as part of a routine reserve strategy. It was liquidated to cushion and mask the scale of mounting losses.

After selling gold to manage losses, the same Government turned around and rushed to Parliament with the Ghana National Gold Purchase Programme (GANRAP) — proposing to buy even more gold for storage.

At what cost? The GANRAP document itself is explicit (GANRAP Document, page 15):

1. Using a benchmark price of $4,000 per ounce,
2. To target 242.68 tonnes,

iii. The estimated budget is a staggering GH¢242.67 billion.

This is not a sound strategy. You cannot liquidate assets to cover losses and call it stability — and then propose a quarter of a trillion-cedi programme to rebuild the same reserves. It is a policy contradiction.

That contradiction is compounded by what the 2025 accounts themselves acknowledge: a departure from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in certain areas of accounting treatment. Parliament is entitled to know the full cost of that departure. This thread is addressed directly in Section 6 below.

3. In 2023, when the BoG reported a GH¢60.8 billion loss for 2022 Financial year and negative equity of about GH¢55.1 billion,
4. NDC leaders described the Central Bank as mismanaged, demanded resignations, and framed the matter as a question of public accountability. Today, the same party cannot dismiss a GH¢15.63 billion annual loss and GH¢93.82 billion negative equity as ‘not a topic for discussion.’
5. It is about credibility, not mere accounting semantics. When the NDC was in opposition, it said the BoG reports profit or loss and must be held accountable like any major public institution.

iii.  The BoG’s own 2025 accounts acknowledge Government’s obligation to restore the capital base through a phased recapitalisation programme from 2026 to 2032. That means today’s losses become tomorrow’s taxpayer cost, debt instrument, or fiscal trade-off. This should be treated as a fiscal risk requiring parliamentary oversight. A functioning Central Bank with a GH¢93.82 billion negative equity hole is still a public finance problem, regardless of its operational continuity.

4. What the NDC Said Then — and What They Are Saying Now

Then:  Resignation within 21 days.

Now:  The 2025 loss is defended as a cost of stability and not treated as a major accountability issue. Does the 21-day resignation test apply only when the NDC is outside government?

Then:  BoG losses were framed as reckless mismanagement and a public finance scandal.

Now:  Defenders stress that the Bank is operationally sound despite the loss. Operational continuity is not a defence against financial accountability.

Then:  NDC warned taxpayers would ultimately recapitalise the BoG.

Now:  The 2025 accounts confirm a Government recapitalisation path to 2032. The warning has become an obligation under their own administration.

5. Core Messages
6. The Majority called BoG losses criminal in opposition and call them stability costs in government.
7. A GH¢93.82 billion negative equity hole is a fiscal warning light.

iii.  If GH¢55.1 billion negative equity in 2022 was enough to trigger the ‘Occupy BoG’ protest, then GH¢93.82 billion in 2025 demands no less.

1. The issue is not whether the BoG can still operate. The issue is who pays for the hole, who caused the hole, and who benefited from the policies that widened it.
2. Recommended Parliamentary Actions
3. I request urgent briefings before the Parliamentary Finance, Economy and Public Accounts Committees by the Governor, Minister for Finance, external auditors and relevant BoG directors.
4. In those briefings, the full costs to the Bank of Ghana arising from its departure from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) must be disclosed to Parliament and the public.

iii.  I demand publication of the full recapitalisation MoU and the fiscal implications of any bonds, cash injections or write-offs.

1. I reiterate the need for an independent review of gold transactions, Gold-for-Oil close-out costs, and revaluation treatment under the 2025 accounting policy framework.
2. I demand that any recapitalisation arrangement requiring public resources be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny and clear fiscal reporting.
3. Conclusion

The Central Bank’s independence must be matched by transparency, discipline and accountability. The Bank must live by them.

The Bank of Ghana’s financial position has been materially impaired under this administration. A GH¢93.82 billion negative equity hole, a recapitalisation commitment running to 2032, and gold asset disposals used to manage — not resolve — structural losses are not the hallmarks of a bank on the path to recovery.

The Government’s credibility will be politically insolvent if it refuses to apply the very accountability standard it once demanded of others. Parliament must act. The recapitalisation clock is running from 2026. The public is entitled to know who is responsible, on what terms, and at what cost to the taxpayer.

Hon. Abena Osei-Asare
Chairperson, Public Account Committee
Parliament of Ghana
May 2025